Should Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards Be Tightened? by Parry, Ian et al.
1616 P St. NW 
Washington, DC 20036 
202-328-5000   www.rff.org    
 

























Carolyn Fischer, Winston Harrington,  
and Ian W.H. Parry  
© 2004, 2007 Resources for the Future. All rights reserved. No portion of this paper may be reproduced without 
permission of the authors. 
Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and discussion. 
They have not necessarily undergone formal peer review. 





Ian W.H. Parry 
Abstract 
This paper develops analytical and numerical models to explain and estimate the welfare effects 
of raising Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for new passenger vehicles. The analysis 
encompasses a wide range of scenarios concerning consumers’ valuation of fuel economy and the full 
economic costs of adopting fuel-saving technologies. It also accounts for, and improves estimates of, 
CAFE’s impact on externalities from local and global pollution, oil dependence, traffic congestion, and 
accidents. The bottom line is that it is difficult to make an airtight case either for or against tightening 
CAFE on pure efficiency grounds, as the magnitude and direction of the welfare change varies across 
different, plausible scenarios. 
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  The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program requires automobile manufacturers to 
meet standards for the average fuel economy of their passenger vehicle fleets; these standards are 
currently 27.5 miles per gallon (mpg) for cars and 22.2 mpg for light-duty trucks (SUVs, minivans and 
pickups). Proponents of raising CAFE standards emphasize two rationales. First, higher standards can 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and lessen the economy’s dependence on a world oil market subject to 
volatility and political manipulation. Second, it is suggested that consumers may undervalue fuel 
economy and therefore that standards need to be tightened over time to ensure that emerging, cost-
effective fuel-saving technologies are adopted (Greene 1998). In fact, the average fuel economy of the 
new passenger vehicle fleet is still below its peak in 1987 due to the rising share of light-duty trucks, 
which now account for half of new passenger vehicle sales (Figure 1).  
  Broad taxes on all oil products and carbon emissions are the most cost-effective policies to 
address energy security and climate change, as they exploit conservation options across all sectors, rather 
than just passenger vehicles; in fact, gasoline accounts for under half of nationwide oil consumption and 
only a fifth of carbon emissions (EIA 2002, Tables 5.11 and 12.3). But if a sector-by-sector approach is to 
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be taken, rather than a more preferable, nationwide approach, then the more relevant comparison is 
between CAFE and an increase in the federal gasoline tax.  
  Higher fuel taxes would (strongly) improve welfare by deterring vehicle use and reducing traffic 
congestion, accidents, and local pollution, in addition to reducing carbon emissions and oil dependence; 
moreover, accounting for the efficient balance between fuel taxes and other taxes in financing the 
government’s budget further strengthens the efficiency rationale for higher fuel taxes (Parry and Small 
2005; Parry 2007; West and Williams 2007). Studies that compare fuel taxes with CAFE standards find 
that the latter are far less cost-effective at reducing gasoline, one reason being that, by lowering fuel costs 
per mile driven, they (slightly) increase, rather than reduce, vehicle use (Kleit 2004; Austin and Dinan 
2005; West and Williams 2005, Parry 2007). Some analysts view these studies as not entirely fair, as they 
assume consumers correctly value view fuel economy and thereby rule out one of the main arguments for 
CAFE (Gerard and Lave 2003). 
Even though CAFE might be well down many economists’ hierarchy of ideal climate and energy 
security policies, it is still important to have a clear conceptual and empirical understanding of the welfare 
effects of CAFE, given the pervasive attention it receives in Congress and the popular press. Several 
studies have estimated the welfare effects of binding CAFE standards using competitive models of the 
new vehicle market and assumptions about technological possibilities for raising fuel economy, leaving 
aside externalities (e.g., Yee 1991; Thorpe 1997; Greene and Hopson 2003). These studies reach different 
conclusions about the sign of the welfare effect, depending on whether they assume cost-effective 
technologies would be adopted by the market or not. 
Two recent studies, by Kleit (2004) and Austin and Dinan (2005), have received particular 
attention. Both analyses assume adoption of all cost-effective technologies; for example, Austin and 
Dinan (2005) emphasize that emerging fuel-saving technologies might have greater value if used instead 
to enhance other vehicle attributes, such as horsepower. Kleit (2004) puts the long-run annual cost of 
reducing gasoline demand by 7 percent under binding fuel economy regulation at $4 billion, while Austin 
and Dinan (2005) put the cost of a 10 percent reduction in gasoline demand at around $3 billion. Both 
studies comment on CAFE’s impact on externalities; for example, Kleit (2004) suggests that the carbon 
and oil dependency benefits from reduced fuel consumption are outweighed by additional congestion and 
accident externalities, as people use fuel-efficient vehicles more intensively.  
Although these earlier studies make very valuable contributions, this paper further contributes to 
the literature in three main respects. First, we integrate both market-failure arguments for CAFE; prior 
studies have discussed either externalities or possible undervaluation of fuel economy, but not both 
together within a single framework. While we do not necessarily endorse the “undervaluation” hypothesis 
ourselves, many other respected analysts do; it is therefore useful to demonstrate how much 
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undervaluation would be necessary for higher standards to significantly improve overall welfare under 
different scenarios for externalities and the costs of regulatory compliance.  
Second, we develop improved quantitative estimates of CAFE’s impact on a number of 
externalities including local pollution, congestion and accidents. We also integrate fuel taxes, which 
partly charge motorists for external costs in higher fuel prices.  
Third, we develop both an analytical model with just one type of vehicle, and a multi-vehicle 
model, solved numerically, that incorporates changes in vehicle-fleet composition, differences in external 
costs across vehicles, and differential standards for cars and light trucks. The single-vehicle model 
provides a simple formula for welfare effects that is easy to implement and that provides an approximate 
prediction of welfare effects from the multi-vehicle model; however the latter model provides additional 
insight and a richer policy simulation.  
  The bottom line is that the efficiency rationale for raising fuel economy standards appears to be 
weak, unless carbon and oil dependency externalities are far greater than mainstream economic estimates, 
or consumers perceive only about a third of the fuel-saving benefits from improved fuel economy. But 
there are two important caveats. One is that even if neither condition is applicable, the downside welfare 
losses from tightening CAFE may not be large. Much depends on whether, without policy change, 
emerging technologies would be incorporated to enhance other vehicle attributes or to improve fuel 
economy—it is very difficult to project, ex ante, which of these scenarios is the more likely. The other 
caveat is that we omit some benefits of reducing oil dependence that have not been quantified, such as 
possible geopolitical benefits from reduced reliance on oil from unstable regions. Although it can be 
argued both ways, if the only practical options at present were to gradually tighten CAFE over time or 
take no action to cut carbon or oil use, we would lean toward the former, even though this position cannot 
be defended by a compelling efficiency analysis. That said, legislation ideally would specify a suspension 
of the progressive tightening of fuel economy if carbon or broader energy taxes were phased in down the 
road, as that would help to address the possibility that action on fuel economy standards might reduce 
pressure for other, more effective and efficient policies.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the single- and multi-vehicle 
models. Section 3 discusses parameter values. Section 4 discusses the main results, sensitivity analysis, 
and our interpretation of the policy implications. The final section discusses additional caveats to the 
analysis.   
  
  3Resources for the Future    Fischer, Harrington, and Parry 
2. MODEL DESCRIPTIONS 
2.1. Single-Vehicle Model 
Preferences. Consider a static model where a period represents the life span of a new passenger vehicle 
(about 14 years). An agent, representing an average over all new vehicle buyers in the real economy, has 
utility: 
(1)  ) , ( ) , ( G M E X D u U − = ,  ) , , , ( q H m v D D = .  
Variables are expressed in per-capita terms, a bar denotes an economywide variable that is exogenous to 
individual agents, and X is a general consumption good.   
D(.) is the private benefit from auto travel, which is increasing in the number of vehicles 
purchased at the start of the period v, vehicle usage during the period m, expressed as hundreds of miles 
driven per vehicle, government spending on highway expansion and maintenance H, and an index of 
(non-fuel economy) vehicle attributes, such as power, comfort, safety, and payload, denoted q. Given that 
all these variables, including the vehicle choice, are economywide averages, they are continuous rather 
than discrete. 
E is an index of external costs from automobile use representing local and global pollution, traffic 
congestion, traffic accidents, and oil dependence; E increases with nationwide vehicle miles per capita 
 and with gasoline consumption vm M = gM G = , where g is gallons consumed per 100 miles. Travel 
time costs and accident risks that are internal to individual agents (as opposed to costs that individuals 
impose on others) are implicitly incorporated in D(.). 
   We define: 
(2)  mg t p G G ) ( + = Γ ρ , 
where pG is the pre-tax retail gasoline price and tG is a specific tax per gallon. Γ  is lifetime fuel costs per 
vehicle, as perceived by agents at the start of the period. If ρ  = 1, agents are “far-sighted” and correctly 
value fuel costs. If ρ < 1, agents are “myopic” and discount fuel costs by an excessive amount; therefore 
they will underestimate the actual fuel-saving benefits they receive over the vehicle life from higher fuel 
economy. While some economists are dismissive of this undervaluation hypothesis, other analysts believe 
that consumers only consider the first few years of savings rather than lifetime savings, pay little attention 
to fuel economy as they are more concerned with other vehicle attributes, or do not expect fuel economy 
to be fully reflected in used car prices. 
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Technology. Firms are competitive and produce vehicles, fuel, and the general consumption good under 
constant returns with zero pure profits.
1 The price of a new vehicle is determined by: 
(3)  ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ q g g C p p v v − + = , 
where 
∧ denotes a baseline value that would occur in the current period with no fuel economy regulation. 
C(.) is the increase in vehicle production cost over the baseline value, due to the incorporation of fuel-
saving technologies to lower the fuel consumption rate to g , the maximum (binding) standard set by the 
government.
2 C(.) is a convex function of  g g − ˆ  (for given  ), and the zero-profit equilibrium implies  q ˆ
) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ q g g C p p v v − = − . 
  In the baseline, technologies emerging at the start of the period may be incorporated into new 
vehicles to improve fuel economy and/or enhance other vehicle attributes. The greater is  —that is, the 
more these technologies are used to improve other attributes—the greater the (marginal) cost of meeting 
the fuel economy standard (
q ˆ
q C g g ˆ / ˆ ∂ ∂ −  >0); this reflects the need to find other (more costly) technologies 
to improve fuel economy.
3 
 
 Government. The government’s budget constraint is: 
(4)  ,  G t F H G = +
where F is a transfer payment from the government to households. We consider cases where reductions in 
fuel tax revenues (caused by the impact of regulation on gasoline demand) are offset by reductions in 
either H or F. We also assume the fuel tax rate is given. In practice, higher fuel economy may increase the 
pressure for a future increase in the fuel tax rate (see Section 5). 
    
                                                      
1 Austin and Dinan (2005) follow Goldberg (1998) by incorporating product differentiation and non-competitive 
vehicle pricing; consequently, part of the burden of regulatory compliance comes at the expense of producer surplus, 
rather than being entirely passed forward to consumers in higher vehicle prices. In this regard, fuel economy 
regulation has less impact on reducing the overall demand for vehicles, and changing the composition of the fleet, in 
their model than in ours; nonetheless, these effects only play a minor role in overall welfare impacts (see below). 
 
2 As in most other studies (Kleit 2004 is an exception), we ignore the possibility that the new standard is imposed on 
top of an existing, binding standard; in this regard, we may understate efficiency costs. Our assumption seems a 
reasonable approximation, however, given the recent rise in fuel prices and the fact that the car standard has been 
unaltered since 1985 (see Small and Van Dender 2006 for more analysis of this). 
 
3 Alternatively, we could assume that technologies to save fuel partly displace improvements in other vehicle 
attributes that would otherwise occur. However, this alternative formulation would be equivalent because of the 
envelope condition; that is, at the margin, the costs of reducing fuel through either incorporating additional 
technologies or diverting technologies that would otherwise have improved other attributes are equalized.     
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Baseline Equilibrium. At the start of the period, agents face the (perceived) budget constraint 
, where I is private income and pX is the price of the general good. In the 
baseline with no regulation, agents choose v, q, g and planned X and m, to maximize utility subject to this 
constraint, accounting for the relation between vehicle price, fuel economy, and other vehicle attributes. 
During the course of the period, they may re-optimize over X and m, based on actual (rather than 
projected) fuel costs paid at the pump.
4 This optimization yields: 
v p X p F I v X ) ( Γ + + = +
(5a)  Γ + = v v p u λ /  
(5b)  g t p v u G G m ) ( ) /( + = λ  
(5c)  q q C v u ˆ ˆ ) /( = λ  
(5d)  g G G C m t p ˆ ) ( − = + ρ , 
where λ is the marginal utility of income. In (5a-c), agents equate the private (monetized) benefit from an 
extra vehicle with the vehicle price and the perceived lifetime fuel cost, the private benefit from 
additional mileage per vehicle with the extra fuel cost per mile and the marginal benefit from other 
vehicle attributes with the incremental cost to vehicle production from enhancing those attributes. In (5d), 
the perceived fuel-saving benefits over the vehicle life from an incremental reduction in the fuel 
consumption rate is equated with the incremental cost to vehicle production. Binding fuel economy 
regulation violates this last condition, by reducing the fuel consumption rate past the point at which 
marginal private benefits and costs are equated, thus: 
(6)  m t p C G G g g ) ( ˆ + > − ρ . 
  
Welfare Effects. The welfare effect from an incremental reduction in g  can be obtained by differentiating 
the agent’s indirect utility function, accounting for changes in external costs, and in F or H to maintain 
government budget balance. The result can be expressed as the sum of three components (see Appendix): 
(7a)  
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4 This is reasonable because driving is an ongoing decision, unlike the one-off vehicle purchase, which requires 
forecasting over a long horizon. 
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EG/λ and EM/λ are the marginal costs of externalities that are proportional to gasoline consumption and 
vehicle miles, in $/gallon and $/mile respectively. As discussed below, the former includes carbon 
emissions, oil dependency, and upstream emissions leakage from the petroleum industry, while the latter 
includes traffic congestion, accidents, and local tailpipe emissions.  
 In  (7b)  g d dM / −  is the increase in vehicle miles from a marginal reduction in the fuel 
consumption rate; it equals the number of vehicles times the increase in miles per vehicle in response to 
improved fuel economy, less a (partially) offsetting effect as regulation increases vehicle prices thereby 
causing a decline in the demand for vehicles (see below).  g d dG / −  is the change in gasoline 
consumption; it equals fuel savings on existing mileage from a unit reduction in g, less the “rebound 
effect”—that is, the extra fuel consumption from the increase in vehicle miles traveled. And µ is the 
marginal social benefit per dollar of tax revenue; if marginal revenue finances transfer payments, 
 (from differentiating (5)) and µ = 1, while if it finances highway spending,  G t dG dF = / λ µ / H u = .  
  The first component in (7a) is the welfare change in the gasoline market; it equals the change in 
gasoline times the gasoline tax, scaled by µ, less the marginal external cost of gasoline consumption. If µ 
= 1, highway spending fixed, and at the margin the fuel tax acts as an externality-correcting tax that 
incorporates some of the external costs of driving in the fuel price paid by motorists. In this case, the 
reduction in gasoline increases welfare only if the gasoline tax undercharges for fuel-related external 
costs.  
If  λ µ / H u = , the gasoline tax is effectively a user fee, as revenues are earmarked for highway 
spending. Suppose  λ / H u >1, then the loss of gasoline tax revenue from reduced gasoline consumption 
produces a larger efficiency loss than in the case when marginal revenues finance transfer payments. This 
is because it now crowds out highway spending for which the social benefit per dollar of extra spending 
exceeds a dollar. Although the reduced spending will likely exacerbate road congestion, this possibility is 
taken into account in empirical studies of the return to highway spending that we use in choosing a range 
of values for  λ / H u .  
The second component in (7a) is a welfare loss equal to the increase in vehicle miles times the 
marginal external cost of mileage-related externalities. 
  The third welfare component is from the change in fuel economy itself and equals the actual (not 
perceived) lifetime fuel-saving benefits per unit reduction in g, less the incremental increase in the vehicle 
cost, times the number of vehicles. If consumers are far sighted, the net effect is a welfare loss since from 
(6),  ) ( ˆ G G g g t p m C + > − —that is, the marginal cost from reducing fuel per 100 miles always exceeds the 
actual fuel-saving benefits, where the latter are correctly anticipated by consumers. However, if 
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consumers are myopic and underestimate the actual benefits from higher fuel economy that they will 
experience over the period, then the third welfare component can be positive. This is because at the point 
when the standard becomes binding, the marginal cost of improving fuel economy equals the perceived 
fuel-saving benefit, which is less than the actual fuel-saving benefit they will experience.  
 






























1 ˆ . 
ηm < 0 is the elasticity of miles driven per vehicle with respect to fuel costs and ηv < 0 is the elasticity of 
vehicle demand with respect to changes in the vehicle price, accounting for changes in perceived lifetime 
fuel costs. Based on NRC 2002, Ch. 4, we assume the marginal cost of reducing g is linear (see also 
Rubin et al. 2006): 
(9) 
0
ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( q q g g q C g g − + − + = − β α , 
where α and β are positive parameters. q
0 denotes other vehicle attributes in a preceding period; as a 
result, to the extent that emerging technologies are used to enhance other vehicle attributes in the current 
period,  , and the marginal cost curve for improving fuel economy is shifted up (as in Austin and 
Dinan 2005). Finally, we assume EG/λ, EM/λ and µ are constant over the relevant range.
5 
0 ˆ q q >
Given a set of parameters and baseline values for variables, the single-vehicle model is easy to 
solve in a spreadsheet by incrementally reducing g, computing the incremental change in m and v from 
(8), and hence the incremental change in M and G from (7b) and marginal welfare effects from (7a).  
Integrating over a range of increments gives the welfare effect of a non-marginal policy change. 
 
2.2. Multi-Vehicle Model 
In this disaggregated model, the representative agent drives i = 1…N
C cars and i = N
C+1…N
T 
light trucks (again, vehicle choice is continuous on an economywide, per capita basis). Firms are 
homogeneous, and each now produces all of the vehicle types; prices, fuel consumption rates, external 
costs per mile driven, and the marginal cost of reducing fuel consumption differ across vehicles. 
                                                      
5 This seems reasonable given that proportionate changes in total oil consumption and vehicle miles traveled are 
modest in our policy simulations. Moreover, aggregate fatality risks from local pollution are roughly proportional to 
atmospheric concentrations (Burtraw et al.  1998).   
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, i, j = 1…N
T, 
where  ii η is an own-vehicle price elasticity and  ij η  (j≠ i) is the elasticity of demand for vehicle i with 
respect to the price of vehicle j.   
  CAFE sets separate standards for the harmonic average miles per gallon across car and light-truck 
fleets, which, for our purposes, is equivalent to imposing maximum fuel-per-mile requirements, expressed 
as 
C g  for cars and 
T g  for trucks. When standards are binding: 
(11)  0 ) (




i v g g
C











Manufacturers choose fuel per 100 miles for each vehicle, and the sales mix, to maximize profits 
is  i i i i i i i
N
i v q g g C p p
T
} ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ {
1 − − − Σ
=
 subject to (11), taking prices as given. This yields  
(12a)  ,  for i ≠ j and either i, j = 1…N
C  or  i, j = N
C+1…N
T  j j i i i i g q C g q C ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ / ) ˆ ( / ) ˆ (
(12b)  ) ( ˆ
k i
k i i i g g C p p − = − − δ , for i = 1…N
C  and  k = C or i = N
C+1…N
T and k = T. 
δC and δT are the shadow prices on the constraints for cars and trucks respectively.  
  (12a) states that within the car or light-truck class, the marginal cost of reducing fuel per 100 
miles is equated across vehicles, while (12b) states that, within a vehicle class, sales prices increase by 
more or less than the increase in vehicle-production costs, according to whether fuel per mile is above or 
below the average for that class; that is, besides technology adoption, manufacturers also meet the fuel 
economy standard by tilting their sales mix toward fuel-efficient vehicles. If fuel economy credits could 
be traded across cars and light trucks this would effectively replace the separate standards with a single 
standard and would improve efficiency by equating the marginal cost of reducing fuel consumption 
across all cars and light trucks.  
  The welfare change from an incremental reduction in the maximum allowable fuel consumption 
rate k g  is the same as in the single-vehicle model, although we are now aggregating over vehicle types. 
The analogous expression to (7a) is: 
(13) 

































































The multi vehicle model is solved in a spreadsheet that selects values for the shadow prices, uses 
these to compute fuel per 100 miles, vehicle prices, and vehicle demands from (10) and (12), and iterates 
  9Resources for the Future    Fischer, Harrington, and Parry 
over the shadow prices until constraints in (11) are met. We incrementally tighten the fuel-per-100-miles 
standard to a given level for one vehicle class, obtaining welfare effects by integrating over (13), and then 
repeat this procedure for the other vehicle class.  
 
 
3. PARAMETER VALUES 
  Here we discuss benchmark parameter values, which are mostly representative of year 2000; 
alternative values are considered later.  
 
3.1. Basic Vehicle Data 
   We first describe existing vehicle data for year 2000 and later adjust fuel economy or other 
vehicle attributes to account for possible technology adoption in the baseline scenario without regulation. 
Following NRC (2002) we distinguish four cars (subcompact, compact, midsize, and large) and six light-
trucks (small SUV, mid SUV, large SUV, small pickup, large pickup, and minivan); relevant data for 
these vehicle classifications are summarized in Table 1.  
Certified fuel economy for 2000 is 27.4, 20.6 and 24.0 mpg across cars, light trucks, and all 
vehicles, respectively, or 3.65, 4.85 and 4.17 gallons per 100 miles; we assume on-road fuel economy is 
85 percent of the certified level (NRC 2002, Ch. 4). Following NRC (2002) we assume all vehicles are 
initially driven 15,600 miles in the first year, decreasing thereafter at 4.5 percent per year, over the 14-
year life cycle. Actual lifetime fuel costs for vehicle i are therefore 
15,600 ; r
S is the social discount rate, which, following practice at 
the Office of Management and Budget, is assumed to be 0.05, and 
1 14
1 ) 045 . 1 /( ) (
−
= + + + Σ ⋅
j S
i G G j r g t p
G G t p +  is the retail fuel price, taken 
to be $1.80 per gallon (higher fuel prices are considered later). Lifetime fuel costs vary from $9,070 
(subcompact) to $16,500 (large SUV). 
We calibrate parameters αi and βi of the marginal cost function for reducing gi to cost data 
compiled by NRC (2002).
6 Marginal costs rise more rapidly for vehicles with lower initial fuel 
consumption rates, as indicated by their having higher βis (Table 1); in fact, the marginal cost for cars as a 
group has a slope about twice that for light trucks as a group. In addition, the lifetime savings per gallon 
reduction in fuel per 100 miles is $2,329; this greatly exceeds all the αis, which reflect the initial cost of 
                                                      
6 We order technology options for each vehicle class analyzed in NRC (2002) by the ratio of average cost to the 
average percentage improvement in fuel economy; fitting regressions of the form in (9) to this data yields our 
coefficient estimates. The NRC cost estimates are expressed as retail price equivalents with a 40 percent markup 
assumed for parts supplier, automaker, and dealer. In this regard, they may overstate pure economic costs since 
some of the markup may reflect a transfer payment. 
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reducing fuel per 100 miles by a gallon assuming that, in the baseline, new technologies are not used to 
enhance other attributes.  
 
3.2. Perceived Fuel Economy Benefits and Technology Adoption to Enhance Other Attributes 






) 045 . 1 /( 1














ρ ,  
where Y ≤ 14 is the horizon over which households consider fuel savings, and r
P is the private discount 
rate. We consider two scenarios for myopic consumers based on expert judgment in NRC (2002), Tables 
4.2 and 4.3: a “high discount rate” scenario with Y = 14 and r
P = 0.12, and a “short horizon” scenario with 
Y = 3 and r
P = 0.
7 These scenarios imply ρ = 0.74 and 0.35, respectively.  
  We consider two scenarios that span possibilities for the extent of new technology adoption to 
enhance other attributes that would occur with no regulation. In one “without-alternative-value” scenario, 
there is no such technology adoption, or  0 ˆ q qi = ; in this case, with no regulation, new technologies 
would be deployed to reduce fuel consumption rates until the last condition in (5d) is satisfied. In the 
other “with-alternative-value” scenario, all new technology adoption in the absence of regulation 
enhances other attributes, with no change in fuel economy; in this case,   increases above  until 
condition (5d) is satisfied. An intermediate case seems most plausible; the without-alternative-value 
scenario is hard to square with intense opposition to fuel economy regulation from the auto industry, 
while the other extreme assumes that consumers still prefer other enhancements to higher fuel economy, 
despite the run-up in fuel prices and the substantial increase in horsepower during the 1990s.   
i q ˆ 0 q
 
3.3. Vehicle Demand and Mileage Elasticities 
We simulate an internal General Motors (GM) model of new vehicle sales to obtain a 10×10 
matrix of own- and cross-price vehicle elasticities.
8 However, the own-price demand responses are too 
large as they include not only substitution between vehicles and reduced overall vehicle demand, but also 
                                                      
7 The first case is based on empirical studies finding that (implicit) private discount rates exceed market rates for a 
wide spectrum of energy saving products. However, very few studies apply to automobiles; one exception is 
Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995), who estimate implicit discount rates of 11−17 percent, although the average new-car-
loan interest rate was 12.6 percent in their sample, suggesting that car buyers may have been liquidity constrained 
rather than myopic. The second case above is based on the views of some auto industry experts and is the 
assumption built into the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s National Energy Modeling System. 
 
8 The GM model estimates demand responses for individual models with respect to the prices of a wide range of 
other models; we aggregate these response to be consistent with our vehicle classes.  
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substitution into used vehicles due to the temporary increase in the ratio of new to used vehicle prices; the 
last effect disappears in the long run as the fleet turns over. We therefore scale back the own-price 
elasticities to account for this (see Appendix B). The resulting 10×10 elasticity matrix is shown in Table 
2: own-price elasticities vary between −1.40 and −3.20. For the single-vehicle model, where there are no 
cross-price effects, we assume  v η  = –0.36 (see Appendix B for a justification). And we choose  m η  = –
0.125; accounting for the reduction in vehicle demand, this implies a rebound effect of around 6–10 
percent across different scenarios.
9  
 
3.4. Local Pollution Costs 
Tailpipe Emissions and Fuel Economy. In the single-vehicle model, we assume that local tailpipe 
emissions are proportional to mileage and independent of fuel economy, while in the multi-vehicle model 
we assume local emissions per mile are the same within both car and light-tuck classes. We validate these 
assumptions as follows (if they do not hold exactly, the welfare change from the gasoline reduction would 
be slightly increased). 
Even though new cars and light trucks must satisfy the emissions per-mile-standard set up for 
their class, emissions rates may increase at a faster rate with vintage for vehicles with higher fuel 
consumption rates, if abatement technologies deteriorate significantly over time. In fact, Harrington 
(1997) identified the higher lifetime emission rates for high fuel consumption vehicles by mapping 
remote-sensing data on emissions by vehicle type and vintage in 1990 from the Arizona Inspection and 
Maintenance (I&M) Program to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)–certified fuel economy 
data. However, these results need to be revisited because of increased durability of emissions control 
equipment and the rapid decline in new vehicle emissions rates since 1990. 
  We repeated Harrington’s analysis using data on emission rates of volatile organic compounds 
(VOC), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and carbon monoxide (CO) from the Arizona I&M program collected in 
1995 and 2002.
10 The 1995 dataset showed that lifetime emissions rates were still significantly affected 
by fuel economy (although less so than in 1990); however, we were unable to find much of an effect in 
the 2002 dataset. As shown in Figure 2, projected CO, hydrocarbons, and NOx emissions per mile for cars 
with certified fuel economy of 20 and 30 mpg are virtually indistinguishable over vehicle lifetimes; the 
same applies within trucks (see Fischer et al. 2005 for more details).  
                                                      
9 Our value for  m η  is approximately consistent with evidence in Small and Van Dender (2006) and was confirmed 
in a personal communication with Ken Small on 1/8/2007.   
 
10 Sample sizes were 60,000 vehicles per month over a 12-month period for 1995 and 35,000 per month for 2002 
(the difference being due to new exemption rules for new vehicles). 
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Local Tailpipe Emissions Damages. We obtained average emissions per mile over car and truck lifetimes 
using data in Figure 3, and above assumptions about miles driven in each year of the vehicle life. We 
multiply average emissions by (adjusted) damage estimates from Small and Kazimi (1995), Table 5, of 
0.19 cents per gram for VOC, 0.69 cents per gram for NOX, and zero for CO, and aggregate over 
pollutants.
11 This gives external damages of 1.1, 2.0, and 1.5 cents per mile for cars, light trucks, and all 
vehicles, respectively.    
 
Upstream Emissions Leakage. The most important pollutant emitted during petroleum production, 
refining, transport, and storage is VOCs. In 1999, petroleum industry VOC emissions were 9.8 grams per 
gallon;
12 multiplying by 0.19 gives damages of 1.9 cents per gallon.  
 
3.5. Global Pollution Costs 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) provide a comprehensive assessment of the potential world damages 
from future global warming due to impacts on agriculture, coastal activities, human health, etc.; they also 
include a crude attempt to incorporate the risk of extreme climate change scenarios. This study, and other 
literature reviews by Pearce (2005) and Tol (2005), put the damage from today’s carbon emissions at 
around $10 to $50 per ton, though damages rise over time. In the Stern Review (Stern 2006), the marginal 
damage from carbon is put at a dramatically larger $311 per ton, although much of the difference is from 
their assumption that the discount rate on future utility is approximately zero, which is problematic in 
other contexts (Nordhaus 2007). For our benchmark, we follow NRC (2002) and assume a damage of $50 
per ton, which is equivalent to 12 cents per gallon. (A gallon of gasoline contains 0.0024 tons of carbon.) 
 
3.6. Congestion Costs 
To our knowledge there has been only one previous attempt to estimate nationwide marginal 
congestion costs (MCCs): FHWA (1997) obtained an estimate of around 5 cents per mile, using speed-
flow curves to estimate MCCs for selected urban and rural road classes and weighting these by respective 
mileage shares.  
                                                      
11 Damages are dominated by mortality effects, and we scale estimates to be consistent with the value of life for 
traffic fatalities assumed below. Although Small and Kazimi’s estimates apply to Los Angeles, where climate and 
topography is especially favorable to pollution formation, they are roughly consistent with estimates for other urban 
areas (e.g., McCubbin and Delucchi 1999). 
 
12 Calculated from EIA (2002) and EPA (1999), Appendix A-5.  
 
  13Resources for the Future    Fischer, Harrington, and Parry 
  We obtain an alternative estimate, by extrapolating results from a computational model of the 
metropolitan Washington, DC, road network (see Fischer et al. 2005 for model details and calibration). 
Fuel economy is a parameter in the model that affects driving costs; incrementally increasing this 
parameter, computing the welfare losses to households from extra congestion and dividing by the 
(aggregate) increase in mileage yields an estimate of MCC = 7.7 cents, averaged across all road classes 
and time of day for Washington, DC. Next, we obtain a relation between MCC and the mileage/pavement 
ratio from the Washington, DC, model by scaling up and down all baseline travel demands, holding road 
capacity fixed. We then inferred values for the mileage/pavement ratio, and hence MCC, for the 75 
largest U.S. cities, using data on travel demand and road capacity in Schrank and Lomax (2002). 
Aggregating over cities using population shares (and assuming MCC = 0 for rural areas) yields a 
nationwide average MCC of 6.5 cents per mile. Based on the two estimates, we assume a nationwide 
MCC of 6.0 cents per mile.
13 
 
3.7. External Accident Costs 
We follow a similar methodology to that in Miller et al. (1998) and Parry (2004) to estimate 
external accident costs per mile by vehicle type (see Appendix B for more detail and justification). This 
involves (a) using crash data to attribute fatal and various non-fatal injuries to vehicles in the accident; (b) 
valuing, for different injuries, quality of life costs, third-party medical burdens and property damages, 
productivity losses, and travel delay costs; and (c) converting costs for different vehicles to a per-mile 
basis. However, sorting out external from internal costs is difficult. Injury risks in single-vehicle crashes 
are usually viewed as internal, while pedestrian injuries are external. Whether injuries to others in multi-
vehicle crashes are external is unclear: all else the same, one extra vehicle on the road raises the risk that 
other vehicles will collide, but if people drive more carefully in heavier traffic, a given accident will be 
less severe. We assume 50 percent of other vehicle injuries are external. Overall, we estimate the mean 
external cost is 4.39 cents per mile (Table 3). 
Table 3, second row from the bottom, also shows that external costs are moderately higher than 
average for pickups and sub-compacts, but below average for minivans, mid-size cars, and small SUVs; 
as a result, vehicle weight/size and external costs have little correlation. However, our approach does not 
control for non-vehicle characteristics such as region, driver age, speed, prior crash record, alcohol use, 
gender, road class, weather, seatbelt use, etc.; for example, above-average external costs for small cars 
                                                      
13 This figure is an underestimate as it excludes non-recurrent congestion from road works and bad weather; 
congestion from accidents is incorporated below. We assume congestion costs per mile are the same for all vehicles 
as differences in vehicle length are small relative to average on-road distance between vehicles (FHWA 1997, Table 
V-23). 
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might be explained by their ownership concentration among young, inexperienced drivers, with greater 
propensity to drink. An econometric analysis by White (2004) that controls for a broad range of non-
vehicle characteristics, estimates that the probability of a vehicle occupant being killed in a two-vehicle 
crash is 61 percent higher if the other vehicle is a light truck than if it is a car; for a pedestrian the risk is 
125 percent higher if hit by a light truck. We develop an alternative estimate of external costs that 
accounts for this finding in a crude way, by assuming external costs are 80 percent greater for all light 
trucks than for all cars, keeping the mean accident cost across all vehicles constant at 4.39 cents per mile 
(see the last row of Table 3).
14 
 
3.8. External Costs of Oil Dependence 
Economic analyses of the external costs of oil dependence have focused on two components. First 
is the “optimum tariff” due to U.S. monopsony power in the world oil market, which depends on how the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other oil producers might respond to a 
change in U.S. imports. Second is the expected cost of macroeconomic disruptions from price shocks that 
the private sector may not fully internalize, such as temporarily idled capital and labor; these costs have 
been assessed using postulated probability distributions for price shocks, estimated oil price-GDP 
elasticities, and assumptions about how firms and consumers internalize price risks. Estimates for the two 
components combined vary between around $0 and $14 per barrel, or 0 to 33 cents per gallon (e.g., CEC 
2003, Table 3.12.; Leiby et al. 1997), NRC (2002) assumed a value of 12 cents per gallon. We use a 
benchmark value of 16 cents to make some allowance for higher oil prices.
15 
  We choose this figure, as it can be justified based on other, careful analysis; nonetheless, it 
excludes potentially important geopolitical costs from oil dependence that are especially difficult to 
quantify. For example, buoyant oil revenues may help to fund terrorist groups and insurgents in Iraq and 
may embolden Iran to pursue nuclear-weapons capability or Russia to crackdown on political freedoms. 
Unilateral oil-conservation measures in the United States will have little near-term effect on these revenue 
flows through lowering the world oil price; however, ultimately the price effect could be greater if 
technologies developed at home are adopted in China and other large oil-consuming nations. There are 
                                                      
14 Our concern with CAFE’s impact on external accident costs differs from that in the mainstream CAFE/safety 
literature, which instead examines implications for total fatality rates, with mixed findings (e.g., Crandall and 
Graham 1989; Kahane 1997; Khazzoom 1997; van Auken and Zellner 2002; Noland 2004). External costs are quite 
different, as they exclude own-driver fatality risk, and include traffic holdups, and a portion of non-fatal injuries to 
other road users, property damage, medical costs, productivity losses, etc. 
 
15 Whether the monopsony tariff component, which accounts for roughly half of this figure, should be included is 
questionable; it only applies if welfare is viewed from a domestic perspective, which conflicts with our measurement 
of carbon damages from a global perspective. 
 
  15Resources for the Future    Fischer, Harrington, and Parry 
also substantial human and budgetary costs associated with the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. 
Nonetheless, according to Delucchi and Murphy (2004), these costs amount to a modest 6 cents per gallon 
or less; moreover, many analysts assume that troop deployments would not be affected by a modest 
reduction in U.S. oil imports.
16 
    
3.9. Government Parameters 
The gasoline tax is 40 cents per gallon.
17 In a dynamic setting, the social value per dollar of 
highway investment spending would be  , where r
H is the rate of return on highway 
spending: Evidence on this is mixed, although a plausible range might be r
H = 0−0.3 (e.g., Shirley and 
Winston 2004; TRB 2006). Using this range and r
S = 0.05 gives 
) 1 /( ) 1 (
S H r r + +
λ / X u  = 0.95 −1.24; we consider this 




4.1. Single-Vehicle Model  
Benchmark Results. Table 4 shows results from the single-vehicle model for a 4-mpg increase in fuel 
economy above currently observed levels. All variables represent present discounted values over a 14-
year horizon, expressed on an annualized basis. Welfare effects vary from a gain of $3.2−6.5 billion in the 
short-horizon scenario to either no change or a loss of $8.4 billion, in the far-sighted/with-alternative-
value scenario.  
  Without alternative value, and far-sighted or high-discount-rate consumers, the fuel economy 
standard is non-binding, because in the absence of regulation, emerging technologies would be adopted to 
raise fuel economy by more than 4 mpg. In the other four cases, regulation is binding and gasoline 
consumption falls by about 13 percent in three of them, and by 4.7 percent in the short-horizon/without-
alternative-value scenario. In all four of these cases, there is an efficiency loss of $0.4−1.2 billion from 
                                                      
16 A further dimension to the oil-dependence problem is that the market is subject to manipulation by a few countries 
with extensive, and nationalized, oil reserves. Although the global efficiency costs of OPEC price manipulation may 
be large (Greene and Ahmad 2005), this does not in and of itself drive any wedge between the domestic demand for 
oil and the oil-import supply curve in the United States. If the United States were a price taker, there would be no 
domestic efficiency rationale for reducing oil demand on these grounds, while to the extent that the United States 
has market power and can influence OPEC behavior and the world price, this is taken into account in computations 
of the optimal tariff from a domestic welfare perspective. If welfare was instead viewed on a global basis, the gains 
to other oil consuming countries from U.S. ability to counteract OPEC price manipulation would need to be 
included. 
 
17 18 cents at the federal level and, on average, 22 cents at the state level (from dividing state tax receipts by 
gasoline sales using DOC 2000, Tables 1022 and 1174).  
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the reduction in gasoline, as the combined external costs from oil dependence, carbon emissions, and 
local upstream emissions (30 cents per gallon) fall short of the fuel tax (40 cents per gallon). There is a 
further efficiency loss of $1.4−2.8 billion from the increase in mileage; although the rebound effect is 
only 6−10 percent (accounting for reduced vehicle demand), the efficiency loss is still significant because 
mileage-related externalities are relatively large (12 cents per mile, equivalent to $2.45 per gallon at 
initial, on-road fuel economy). In the short-horizon cases, welfare gains from the increase in fuel 
economy itself easily outweigh efficiency losses from the reduction in gasoline and increase in mileage. 
However, this does not apply in the high discount rate case, leaving an overall net welfare loss of $2.4 
billion, while with far-sighted consumers, the increase in fuel economy results in a welfare loss, not gain, 
of $4.7 billion.
18   
  
Sensitivity Analysis. Table 5 shows the sensitivity of welfare effects to different assumptions. We vary the 
stringency of the fuel economy standard, the retail fuel price, the mileage and vehicle demand elasticities, 
the social discount rate, the marginal value of government tax revenue, fuel-related externalities, and the 
cost of technology adoption. The main qualitative findings in the benchmark results are robust to nearly 
all these parameter variations. That is, when consumers are far sighted or have high discount rates, 
tightening fuel economy standards typically reduces efficiency in the with-alternative-value scenarios and 
has no effect in the without-alternative-value case, while tightening standards improves efficiency when 
consumers have short horizons.  
In quantitative terms however, the results can be somewhat sensitive to different assumptions. For 
example, in the short-horizons cases, welfare gains are about twice as high if fuel prices are $2.50 per 
gallon rather than $1.80, while gains are cut in half if the social discount rate for fuel savings is 12 
percent rather than 5 percent. When fuel-related externalities are raised to 80 cents per gallon⎯that is, 
carbon damages are $220 per ton, or oil-dependency costs are $28 per barrel⎯welfare gains are increased 
by 70 percent or more in the short-horizons cases, become positive in the high discount rate/with-
alternative-value scenario, but remain slightly negative in the far-sighted/with-alternative-value scenario. 
And when standards are raised by 2 mpg rather than 4 mpg, welfare effects vary from a loss of $3.5 
billion to a gain of $4.5 billion. 
 
                                                      
18 Austin and Dinan (2005) consider a scenario equivalent to our far-sighted/with-alternative-value scenario, 
ignoring impacts on externalities. They estimate that a 10 percent reduction in gasoline consumption would induce 
welfare losses of $3.6 billion, assuming a rebound effect of 20 percent; for the same rebound effect and fuel 
reduction, the corresponding welfare loss in our model would be $3.5 billion. 
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4.2. Multi-Vehicle Model 
Table 6 displays results for the multi-vehicle model for a 4-mpg increase in both car and light-
truck standards under benchmark parameter assumptions. The overall welfare effects are roughly similar 
to those predicted by the single-vehicle model (within 1−7 percent across the different scenarios). 
The main reason for this similarity is that even though there is some substitution away from 
larger cars, SUVs, and pickup trucks toward smaller vehicles (as indicated by the larger percentage 
reduction in vehicle sales for the former), changes in vehicle fleet composition play a relatively minor 
role in meeting the fuel economy standard (Kleit 2004, Greene 1991). Instead, more than 90 percent of 
the improvement comes from technology adoption, as indicated by the substantial increase in fuel 
economy across all vehicles. This means that differences in (mileage-related) external costs across 
vehicles play a minor role in welfare effects; this applies even if we use the alternative method in Table 3 
for measuring accident externalities across cars and light trucks.  
In the lower portion of Table 6, we consider an increase in car and light-truck standards but allow 
trading of fuel economy credits across all vehicles, keeping the total reduction in gasoline use the same as 
in the corresponding scenario without trading by slightly adjusting regulatory stringency. In this case, 
slightly more of the burden of fuel economy improvement is borne by trucks and slightly less by cars, 
given that marginal compliance costs without trading are larger for cars than trucks, though only 
moderately so.
19 Consequently, the fuel economy component of the welfare change is moderately 
greater.
20  
Finally, in Table 7 we raise the light-truck standard by 6.8 mpg above the 2000 standard to equate 
it with the car standard of 27.5 mpg; the upper and lower halves of Table 7 illustrate cases with and 
without trading of credits across cars and trucks. (This time, we allow fuel consumption to vary between 
scenarios with and without trading.) Qualitative results are similar to those above; welfare gains are 
positive if consumers have short horizons, but zero or negative when consumers are far-sighted or have 
excessive discount rates. And allowing for trading of fuel economy credits reduces welfare 
losses/increases welfare gains, but the effect is not huge.
21 
                                                      
19 Even though the marginal cost curve for cars has twice the slope of that for light trucks (compare the β parameters 
in Table 1), increasing truck fuel economy from 20.6 to 24.6 mpg requires a reduction of 0.79 gallons per 100 miles; 
increasing car fuel economy from 27.4 to 31.4 mpg requires a smaller reduction of 0.46 gallons per 100 miles.  
 
20 This finding is broadly consistent with Austin and Dinan (2005). However Rubin et al. (2006) estimate much 
larger cost savings; they also find that cost savings from credit trading within manufacturers easily exceed those 
from credit trading between (heterogeneous) firms. 
 
21 Welfare losses from the increase in mileage are smaller for this policy; this is because the offsetting reduction in 
the vehicle stock is greater when light-trucks bear a disproportionate burden of regulatory costs, as demand for light 
truck vehicles is more price-sensitive than for cars. 
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4.3. Should CAFE Standards Be Tightened? 
  What are we to make of the above results? For those who believe consumers have short horizons, 
tightening CAFE seems justifiable on efficiency grounds, although we ourselves are reluctant to side with 
this view, unless solid econometric evidence (rather than anecdotal evidence) emerges in its favor. On the 
other hand, for those who reject the fuel economy undervaluation hypothesis, whether tightening CAFE 
would have much effect, or produce large efficiency losses, is difficult to gauge ex ante; it depends on 
whether state-of-the-art technologies that can improve fuel economy might also have value in alternative-
vehicle enhancements.  
  While we are eager for the federal government to phase in carbon and oil taxes that reflect 
marginal external costs,
22 in the meantime, if we had to make an immediate recommendation on CAFE, it 
would be to gradually raise the standards over time. We cannot justify this position on a compelling cost–
benefit analysis, nor can we be entirely confident that the policy would have much impact above fuel 
economy improvements that might occur in the absence of regulation. Rather, this recommendation is 
based on our subjective view that more likely than not, additional benefits from higher fuel economy that 
have not been quantified in the mainstream externality literature (see below), outweigh the possible 
downside efficiency costs of a gradual tightening of the standards over time. As the reader may have 
guessed, we are sympathetic to certain arguments on either side of the CAFE debate, and it has been a 




  In addition to the usual caveats about the need to update the results as evidence on parameter 
values improves over time, we finish up by discussing additional issues that are not handled in our 
analysis. 
  First, higher fuel economy standards may produce benefits that are difficult to quantify and that 
are excluded from the above analysis. For example, regulation may promote the development of fuel-
saving technologies for which the social rate of return exceeds the return on other innovative activity that 
might be crowded out with enhanced R&D into vehicle fuel economy. Although this is an empirical 
question that needs attention in future research, we suspect that the social return on fuel-saving 
                                                      
22 Taxes have a number of advantages over quantity-based regulations like cap-and-trade carbon permits (Parry 
2003; Nordhaus 2006). For example, energy tax revenue might be used to reduce other distortionary taxes, while 
freely allocated permit systems are inequitable as they transfer large rents from energy consumers to (wealthy) 
stockholders in energy companies. Volatility in permit prices can also deter large up-front investments in cleaner 
technologies. ` 
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technologies might be quite large, given their potential for deployment in large, rapidly industrializing 
nations such as China. Thus, advances in technology driven by regulation at home may have a multiplier 
effect on addressing the threat of climate change and the geopolitical dimensions of western dependence 
on oil from unstable regions. Another possible benefit is that if the United States were to implement fuel 
economy regulation and other serious measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions, this might shift 
international pressure on climate control away from the United States towards developing nations.  
  A second caveat is that we do not model the potential for CAFE to affect vehicle weight or size. 
Allowing manufacturers to improve fuel economy by downweighting, in addition to changing the vehicle 
sales mix, would lower the costs of regulatory compliance. The impact on external accident costs is 
unclear and would depend in part on how the weight discrepancy between cars and light trucks is 
affected.  
Finally, we assume the fuel tax is exogenous. In practice, as fuel economy improves and the base 
of gasoline taxes is eroded, this will increase pressure at both the state and federal level for an increase in 
fuel tax rates, which would be welfare improving (Parry and Small 2005); by ignoring this possible policy 
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APPENDIX A: ANALYTICAL DERIVATIONS 
Deriving Equation (7) 
 Using  (1)−(3), the household budget constraint, and assuming binding regulation  g g = , the 
representative agent’s indirect utility function, V(.), with fuel costs correctly valued, is defined by: 
(A1)  MAX H F G M E g V = ) , ), , ( , ( ) ), , , , ( ( X q H m v D u ) , ( G M E −  
{} v g m t p q g g C p X p F I G G v X ] ) ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ [ + + − + − − + +λ . 
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Partially differentiating (A1) gives: 
(A2)  v q C m t p V g g G G g )] ˆ ( ) [( ˆ− − + − = λ ,      M M E V − = ,     G G E V − = ,     λ = F V ,      .  H H u V =
Totally differentiating the indirect utility function in (A1) with respect to g  gives:  














V V H F G M g + + + + . 
Substituting (A2) in (A3) and multiplying by −1 gives: 




























− − . 
Multiplying and dividing the last two terms in (A4) by  g d dG tG /  and substituting for µ as defined in 
(7b), we obtain (7a). 





APPENDIX B: SOME DETAILS ON MODEL CALIBRATION 
Adjusting own-price vehicle elasticities from the GM model 
We simulate a dynamic model of vehicle choice, developed by Harrington et al. (2003), to obtain 
long-run estimates of the own-price elasticities for cars as a group, denoted  CC η ˆ , and light trucks as a 
group, denoted  TT η ˆ . Results are  CC η ˆ  = −0.79 and  TT η ˆ  = −0.85. We then express the own price elasticity 
for car i computed from the GM model as  = ii η i j ji i j v v / η
≠ Σ ) / ( i j ji i j ii v v η η
≠ Σ − + , where i, j = 1…N
C. 
The first component in this expression captures the substitution effects among cars. The second 
component encompasses all other effects⎯reduced overall vehicle demand, substitution into trucks, and 
people holding onto vehicle i longer; to remove the last effect, we multiply the second component by 
CC CC η η ~ / ˆ , where  CC η ~  is the own-price elasticity for cars as a group from the GM model, equal to −2.25. 
Light-truck elasticities are similarly scaled using  TT TT η η ~ / ˆ , where  TT η ~  = −0.97. 
 
Own-price vehicle elasticity in the single-vehicle model 
From simulating the Harrington et al. (2003) model for a 1 percent increase in the price of all cars 
and light trucks, we choose ηv = −0.36 for the single-vehicle model. In the GM model the aggregate 
vehicle demand elasticity is approximately −1.0, which is consistent with other estimates (e.g., McCarthy 
1996, page 543). However, these other estimates are too elastic for our purposes as they are short rather 
than long run and include substitution between new and used vehicles.  
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Estimating external accident costs 
Crash data averaged over 1998–2000 is used to assign traffic injuries to different vehicle types.
23 
For single-vehicle crashes we assume occupant injury risks are internal, while injuries to pedestrians and 
cyclists are external. In crashes involving n >1 vehicles, each vehicle is responsible for 1/n of the 
pedestrian/cyclist injuries, which are external, and 1/(n-1) of the injuries to other vehicle occupants.  
  Traffic delay, property damage, medical costs, emergency services, and administrative costs are 
divided equally among vehicles in the crash. We assume 100 percent of travel delay costs, 75 percent of 
property damages, and 85 percent of other costs (which are mainly covered by group insurance) are 
external.
24 Productivity losses at work and home to pedestrians and 50 percent of others injured in multi-
vehicle crashes are external; for single-vehicle crashes, only the tax revenue components (assumed to be 
40 percent) of workplace productivity losses is taken as external. We use estimates from NHTSA 
(2002b), Table A-1, to value quality of life costs, property damage, travel delay, productivity, medical, 
and administrative costs for different injury categories. Aggregate external costs per vehicle were 
converted to per mile costs using estimates of annual miles driven across vehicle types.
25    
                                                      
23 We use the FARS (Fatality Analysis Reporting System) data for all accidents involving a fatality and the GES 
(General Estimates System) data for all other accidents (both are collected by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration). The GES data provides an extrapolation of national estimates based on a representative sample of 
police-reported crashes; following Miller et al. (1998), page 18, we scale up non-fatal injuries by 12 percent and 9 
percent for police and survivor under-reporting, respectively. Both the FARS and GES provide information on the 
vehicles involved in each accident and driver characteristics. Injuries are classified according to the system in police 
reported data: fatality (K), disabling (A), evident (B), possible (C), property damage only (O), injured severity 
unknown (UI), unknown if injured (U). 
 
24 If insurance is truly lump sum and premiums do not change in response to accidents, then all property damage is 
external. In practice people pay deductibles, and premiums vary, albeit very weakly, with stated annual mileage. 
Moreover, individuals typically pay higher premiums for three years following a claim, though the value of these 
extra payments is a minor fraction of the property damage (if not, there would be little incentive for insurance).  
  If a driver injures someone else, they may also be liable for damages though the tort system. However to be 
liable, the driver would have be judged at fault; yet much of the problem is that additional traffic on the road raises 
the risks of collisions, even if no one is driving recklessly. And even if an individual is judged to be liable, they may 
have very limited resources, certainly not the several million dollars needed to compensate for the value of life if 
someone else is killed. 
 
25 Mileage shares for vehicle classes were obtained from the National Personal Transportation Survey, weighting 
results from the 1995 and 2001 surveys by 1/3 and 2/3 respectively. Total mileage per vehicle class was obtained by 
multiplying these shares by economywide annual passenger vehicle mileage, averaged over 1998–2000, of 2,471 
billion (from www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSFAnn/TSF2000.pdf).  
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Notes. Emissions rates are obtained by regressing emissions on fuel economy for vehicles of a given age, and 
reading off emissions from this relation at miles per gallon of 20 and 30. 




















Vehicle class (thousands) price, $ lifetime fuel





subcompact 756 15,280 30.2 3.3 9,070 368 2,892
compact 2,650 15,647 29.1 3.4 9,412 310 2,789
midsize 3,205 21,907 26.2 3.8 10,454 81 2,638
large 748 25,266 23.9 4.2 11,460 641 1,569
total cars 7,359 19,314 27.4 3.6 9,989 250 2,610
light trucks
small SUV 617 18,571 23.3 4.3 11,755 336 1,559
mid SUV 1,672 27,557 20.3 4.9 13,493 85 1,390
large SUV 834 34,051 16.6 6.0 16,500 174 818
small pickup 1,026 17,551 22.2 4.5 12,338 102 1,705
large pickup 2,121 23,362 22.4 4.5 12,228 201 936
minivan 1,200 24,490 17.9 5.6 15,302 243 1,563
total trucks 7,470 24,481 20.6 4.9 13,292 176 1,282
total cars and trucks 14,829 21,917 24.0 4.2 11,418 213 1,941
fuel economy Initial certified
fuel economy




a Fuel costs are discounted at 5 percent. 
b α
i is the cost of incorporating technologies to reduce fuel consumption per 100 miles by one gallon below current 
levels, assuming emerging technologies are not used to enhance other vehicle attributes. β
i is the rate at which 
marginal costs increase.  
 
Sources. Sales data is compiled from Wards Automotive Handbook 2001, while vehicle prices are a sales-weighted 
average of prices for individual models from www.Edmunds.com. To classify vehicles according to the NRC 
subgroups, we used a combination of the Wards descriptions and EPA classifications: luxury vehicles, two-seaters, 
large vans, and hybrids were excluded.  













sub- mid small mid large small large
compact compact size large SUV SUV SUV pickup pickup minivan
subcompact -2.18 1.17 0.35 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01
compact 0.27 -2.07 0.58 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02
mid Size 0.12 0.80 -1.88 0.36 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.06
large 0.02 0.12 1.98 -2.24 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10
small SUV 0.04 0.32 0.11 0.00 -3.20 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.02
mid SUV 0.04 0.24 0.45 0.07 0.17 -2.58 0.24 0.13 0.23 0.27
large SUV 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.02 1.09 -1.88 0.02 0.39 0.43
small pickup 0.04 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.00 -2.55 0.38 0.03
large pickup 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.32 -1.40 0.03
minivan 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.04 -2.41
Table 2. Vehicle Demand Elasticites
Sources. From simulating the GM model and adjusting the own-price elasticities (see Appendix B).


















sub- mid small mid large small large
comp. comp. size large SUV SUV SUV pickup pickup minivan average
Quality of life costs
pedestrains 1.20 0.85 0.61 0.90 0.54 0.72 0.37 0.87 0.88 0.53 0.76
other vehicle occupants 1.94 1.66 1.27 1.79 1.34 1.78 0.95 2.13 2.67 1.12 1.65
Property damage 0.51 0.39 0.26 0.30 0.20 0.26 0.13 0.31 0.24 0.20 0.29
Work/household prod. loss 0.67 0.52 0.38 0.49 0.31 0.47 0.21 0.49 0.47 0.29 0.44
Traffic holdups 0.29 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.17
Medical, emerg. serv., admin. 1.85 1.36 0.89 1.06 0.78 0.84 0.47 1.28 1.01 0.67 1.07
Total 6.46 5.00 3.56 4.71 3.27 4.23 2.21 5.25 5.41 2.93 4.39
Alternative method 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 5.91 5.91 5.91 5.91 5.91 5.91 4.39
Cost component
cars light trucks
Table 3. External Accident Costs Across Vehicles
(cents per mile)
Sources. See Appendix B for estimation methods and data sources. The alternative method re-allocates external 
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alternative value without with without with without with
Certified fuel economy in free market baseline
gallons per 100 miles 2.8 4.2 3.2 4.2 3.8 4.2
miles per gallon 35.3 24.0 31.0 24.0 26.4 24.0
Change in gasoline from free market baseline
billion gallons (discounted) 0 -12.3 0 -12.2 -4.4 -12.1
% 0 -13.4 0 -13.3 -4.7 -13.2
Change in mileage, % 0 1.1 0 1.1 0.6 1.3
Change in vehicle sales, % 0 -0.9 0 -0.8 -0.1 -0.7
Rebound effect, % 0 6.4 0 6.9 10.3 7.6
Components of welfare change, $billion (discounted)
total 0 -8.4 0 -2.4 3.2 6.5
gasoline reduction 0 -1.2 0 -1.2 -0.4 -1.2
mileage increase 0 -2.4 0 -2.6 -1.4 -2.8
fuel economy 0 -4.7 0 1.4 5.1 10.6
Welfare change per gallon of fuel reduction, $ 0 -0.69 0 -0.20 0.74 0.54
Table 4. Benchmark Results for Single-Vehicle Model
(effect of 4 mpg increase in fuel economy standard)
Myopic consumers Myopic consumers
high discount rate short horizons consumer








































alternative value without with without with without with
Benchmark results 0 -8.4 0 -2.4 3.2 6.5
Increase in fuel economy standard (4 miles per gallon)
2 miles per gallon 0 -3.5 0 -0.3 0 4.5
8 miles per gallon 0 -20.0 0 -9.6 6.4 6.0
Gasoline price ($1.80 per gallon)
$1.50 per gallon 0 -8.5 0 -3.5 1.9 3.9
$2.50 per gallon 0 -8.0 0 0.3 6.4 12.7
Miles per vehicle elasticity (-0.125)
-0.05 0 -6.4 0 -0.3 4.1 8.8
-0.25 0 -11.7 0 -5.9 1.8 2.8
Demand for vehicles elasticity (-0.36)
0 0 -10.3 0 -4.1 3.0 5.1
-0.8 0 -6.1 0 -0.3 3.5 8.3
Social discount rate (0.05)
0.12 0 -7.5 0 -3.2 1.4 3.2
Marginal value per $ of government spending ($1.00)
$0.95 0 -8.1 0 -2.2 3.3 6.8
$1.25 0 -9.6 0 -3.6 2.8 5.3
Fuel-related external costs (30 cents per gallon)
0 0 -12.0 0 -6.1 1.9 2.9
80 cents per gallon 0 -2.2 0 3.7 5.4 12.6
initial cost of a gallon reduction in fuel per 100 miles, α ($213)
$107 0 -8.5 0 -2.5 2.7 6.6
$426 0 -8.5 0 -2.5 3.5 6.6









Notes. Figures in parentheses in the first column indicate benchmark parameter values.
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alternative value without with without with without with
No trading of fuel economy credits
Change in certified miles per gallon
subcompact 0 4.2 0 4.2 2.2 4.2
compact 0 4.0 0 4.0 2.1 4.0
midsize 0 3.6 0 3.6 1.9 3.6
large 0 5.2 0 5.2 2.5 5.2
small SUV 0 3.9 0 3.9 1.9 3.9
mid SUV 0 3.6 0 3.6 1.8 3.6
large SUV 0 4.4 0 4.4 2.3 4.4
small pickup 0 3.4 0 3.5 1.7 3.5
large pickup 0 4.3 0 4.3 2.2 4.3
minivan 0 3.6 0 3.6 1.8 3.6
Change in vehicle sales, %
subcompact 0 2.25 0 1.60 1.00 1.89
compact 0 0.14 0 0.15 0.54 0.15
midsize 0 -2.06 0 -1.54 -0.67 -1.77
large 0 -2.40 0 -1.87 -1.76 -2.12
small SUV 0 2.47 0 1.72 1.72 2.05
mid SUV 0 -0.12 0 -0.08 0.04 -0.10
large SUV 0 -2.66 0 -2.01 -1.05 -2.31
small pickup 0 2.34 0 1.65 1.36 1.95
large pickup 0 -3.98 0 -2.90 -1.18 -3.38
minivan 0 0.62 0 0.48 0.68 0.55
Change in gasoline, % 0 -13.7 0 -13.6 -6.2 -13.6
Components of welfare change, $billion (discounted)
total 0 -8.6 0 -2.9 3.8 7.0
gasoline reduction 0 -1.3 0 -1.3 -0.6 -1.3
mileage increase 0 -2.6 0 -3.1 -1.8 -2.9
fuel economy 0 -4.7 0 1.6 6.2 11.2
Welfare change per gallon of fuel reduction, $ 0 -0.65 0 -0.22 0.55 0.54
Trading of fuel economy credits
Change in gasoline, % 0 -13.7 0 -13.6 -6.2 -13.6
Welfare change, $billion (discounted)
total 0 -7.5 0 -2.7 4.4 7.6
fuel economy 0 -3.6 0 1.7 6.8 11.8
Welfare change per gallon of fuel reduction, $ 0 -0.57 0 -0.21 0.64 0.58
consumers short horizons
Table 6. Results from the Multi-Vehicle Model
(effect of 4 mpg increase in fuel economy standard)
Far-sighted Myopic consumers
high discount rate































alternative value without with without with without with
No trading of fuel economy credits
Change in gasoline, % 0 -14.3 0 -13.9 -4.5 -14.0
Components of welfare change, $billion (discounted)
total 0 -7.4 0 -2.5 2.5 7.2
gasoline reduction 0 -1.4 0 -1.3 -0.4 -1.4
mileage increase 0 0.3 0 -0.9 -1.2 -0.4
fuel economy 0 -6.3 0 -0.3 4.1 9.0
Welfare change per gallon of fuel reduction, $ 0 -0.54 0 -0.19 0.58 0.53
With trading of fuel economy credits
Change in gasoline, % 0 -15.1 0 -14.8 -7.6 -14.9
Components of welfare change, $billion (discounted)
total 0 -6.3 0 -1.4 3.9 8.1
gasoline reduction 0 -1.3 0 -1.3 -0.7 -1.3
mileage increase 0 -0.8 0 -1.8 -1.4 -1.4
fuel economy 0 -4.2 0 1.7 6.0 10.8
Welfare change per gallon of fuel reduction, $ 0 -0.44 0 -0.10 0.54 0.57
Table 7. Raising Light-Truck Standard to Car Standard
consumers short horizons
Far-sighted Myopic consumers
high discount rate
Myopic consumers
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